Oasis Plan's Historical Primer, (3/5)

In early 2011, populations in the Middle East and North Africa with little to no institutional experience in Western democracy began to clamor in unison for it. More than ineffectually clamor for it, a number of these populations achieved momentous results, only to see their countries change in ways which they would never have desired.

This is the story of the Arab Spring, when whole regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) fell like dominoes, only to rise again changed in ways rarely better than before. As this story still impacts the Middle East, it is ineludible as background for Lyndon LaRouche’s Oasis Plan.

This is the fourth article in a septempartite series which presents LaRouche’s Oasis Plan. The Oasis Plan seeks to end the conflict between Israel and its neighbors by incentivizing cooperation towards common goals amongst the regional countries. To contextualize the decisions now facing the statesmen as they evaluate the Plan, the pertinent regional history is recounted in five parts, of which this overview is the third. If you are already familiar with Middle Eastern history, then please feel free to skip to the final installment’s conclusion after reviewing the introduction.

Arab Spring Ascendant (2010 - 2017)

Tunisia

The regional upset started as anti-governmental protests in Tunisia on December 17th, 2010. At a bazaar in the small town of Sidi Bouzid along the Oued El Fekka river, fruit vendor Mohamed Boauzizi, aged 26, grew so frustrated at police extortion that he immolated himself. This catalyzed widespread dissatisfaction about governmental corruption, taxation and the depressed economy, resulting in protests. The protests capitalized on social media’s prevalence in the age of smartphones to disseminate news quickly across the whole country, and against a regime which autocratically controlled mainstream media. The pressure on the government grew to such extent that by January 14th, 2011, Tunisian president Zine El Abidine ben Ali was ousted after 23 years in power in what has been dubbed the Jasmine Revolution.

The regime change was so straightforward and rapid that it dazed Tunisian society and government. Tunisians seemed unsure in which direction to head, and different factions competed to define the country’s new path. In the election for the Constituent Assembly in October 2011, this uncertainty resulted in voters electing a coalition of three parties to run Tunisia. The Troika Government was headed by Ennahda, a Salafist party founded in the 1970s but banned since the 1980s which remained organized in the underground. It shared power with two secularist parties, Ettakatol (founded in 1994 but banned ever since) and Congress for the Republic (CPR), a party spearheading the Jasmine Revolution’s objectives.

The diffident coalition’s first crisis were two high-profile assassinations in 2013. The first was of Chokri Belaid on February 6th. Belaid had been a progressivist critic of Ennahda, which cast suspicion on that party as the culprit. The second was of Mohammed Brahmi on July 25th. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ultimately claimed responsibility for both murders. In protest, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT paralyzed the country by declaring universal strikes. This helped to rehabilitate UGTT’s public image since it had drifted from its apolitical roots as an agitator for national unity during the revolution to expel the colonial French in the 1950s, only for its leadership to become sell-out toadies of the previous president ben Ali.

Recognizing the worsening turmoil in Tunisia, in 2013 the party Nidaa Tounes – composed of constituencies which had benefitted from ben Ali’s administration – proposed that the Constituent Assembly be disbanded and the government run by impartial technocrats. (p. 2, ¶3-4) This measure was not pursued, but it inspired four key power bases – a quartet comprising the Tunisian Confederation of Industry (employers’ union), Tunisian Human Rights League, Tunisian Order of Lawyers, and the UGTT – to start a dialogue about running the country for the country’s best interest. This stewardship resulted in the Quartet’s leaders being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.

Regrettably, the very reasons which drove Boazizi to self-immolation and kickstarted the Jasmine Revolution – governmental corruption, taxation and economic depression – were not solved by dialogues between political elites. This was painfully demonstrated by the uptick in suicides amongst Tunisians in October 2016, with 71 out of 113 committed by younger persons aged 26 – 35. Perceiving bleak prospects, many young Tunisians resorted to the harqa, illegal emigration in dingeys across the Mediterranean into Europe, or even more perilous, joined ISIS for combat in Syria and Iraq.

In view of the Jasmine Revolution’s underwhelming results, Kais Saied rose to power in 2019. In 2021, President Kais Saied dissolved the Parliament and assumed sweeping powers to silence all dissent. (¶ 6) In 2024 he won re-election by 90.7% after his personally appointed electoral commission eliminated 14 out of 17 rival candidates. Thus, it appears that Tunisia is retrogressing.

Egypt

Anti-governmental protests spread instantaneously to Egypt. Multitudes gathered in and around Tahrir Square in the capital of Cairo on January 25th, 2011. The regime attempted to disperse the multitudes in and around the square, but by February 11th, 2011, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was ousted after 30 years in power in what has been dubbed the Lotus Revolution.

In 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood’s support allowed Mohamed Morsi to eke out a victory in that year’s presidential election. After a year of being subject to nightly satire nationwide by surgeon-turned-talk-show host Bassem Jossef, a generalissimo in the person of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi toppled Morsi, then raced to curtail the very freedoms which the Lotus Revolution had espoused. Considering that Egypt’s constitution in 2019 had been customized to extend the presidential term of office from four years to six and specifically exempted el-Sisi from the two-term limit by allowing him a third potential term, he may serve as president until 2034, if not longer.

Libya

The Arab Spring played out very differently in Libya. On February 19th, 2011, police in Benghazi had arrested Abdelhafiz Ghogha, Esq., representing over 1000 prisoners whom security forces had killed in Tripoli’s Abu Salim jail back in 1996. Outrage over this arrest led to widespread protests, which the regime’s military and security forces attempted to suppress by firing live into the crowds. This enflamed the protests, which wound up overwhelming Benghazi with the assistance of security personnel who defected to the protesters. President Muammar Gadaffi declared that he would kill all opposition, prompting the Arab League to recommend that the UN Security Council impose a no-fly zone over Libya.

In March 2011, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and several Gulf allies invaded Libya with the avowed purpose of avoiding a bloodbath. President Gadaffi’s government in Tripoli was set to flight, and by October of that year, the opposition captured and lynched him in the city of Sirte after 42 years in power.

Since then, Libya has been torn by warlords vying for power, and international garrisons still dot the country in what is supposed to be a peacekeeping mission. Since 2011, Libya’s oil exports have declined by 90%, and its GDP has plummeted by $200 billion. Economic desperation has driven many Libyans to emigrate illegally to Europe, or to swell the ranks of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

Yemen

The Arab Spring reached Yemen in January 2011, but conditions in the country were quite different than with the previous three countries. Instead of the Arab Spring punctuating a long period of stability which belied widespread discontent and inertia, Yemen had been tottering on civil war since the 1960s.

The case is that Yemen spans 203,850 square miles (527,968 km²), making it the world’s fifty-second largest country, which is partially why it was not one single country for much of its existence. The north had formed the autocratic Kingdom of Yemen under sharia law and was founded on territory which the Ottomans had ceded in 1918, with its capital at Sanaa. In the south lay the British Protectorate of Aden and the Hadhramaut established in 1839 to provision ships bound for or returning from Asia. Different influences made the two countries develop very distinctly, such that from the time unification was proposed, it took about twenty-two years to achieve it in 1990.

Four years later, those competing influences – Shi’ite fundamentalism in the north (championed by the organization Ansar Allah, which is led by the Houthi family and thus known to outsiders as the “Houthis”) against Sunni secularism in the south – exploded into a civil war. Over the course of seventy days, 6000 civilians and soldiers were wounded and 1500 killed, until the north invaded and pacified the south.

Yemeni factionalism flared up again in 2004 in what has been dubbed the Sa’adah Insurgency. Houthi rebels concentrated in the northwesternmost Sa’adah governorate (province) attempted to overthrow the Yemeni government headquartered in Sanaa. The conflict opened a front in 2009 with Saudi Arabia, which borders Sa’adah governorate to the north, during which Saudi forces conducted airstrikes and artillery shelling of Houthi targets. There was also a bombing of the bin Salman masjid in the Sa’adah township on May 2nd, 2008, killing fifteen worshippers, which introduced the element of terrorism to this conflict (to date no person nor organization has claimed responsibility for the bombing). By 2010, the insurgency had killed around 1700 Yemenis and caused well over $270 million in economic damages.

The Arab Spring in 2011 thus offered fresh reasons for Yemenis to kill each other. On January 26th, 2011, over 16,000 protesters converged in Yemen’s capital of Sanaa, demanding political reforms. The regime cracked down harshly on the protest, killing as many as 2000 people. The crackdown’s harshness spurred high-level defections to the opposition, such as military commanders, tribal leaders, tycoons and prominent political rivals. This opposition bombarded the presidential palace, nearly killing President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was evacuated to Saudi Arabia for his wounds’ treatment. The Gulf Cooperation Council (composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) finally brokered a deal on November 11th, 2011, whereby President Saleh could resign and gain amnesty for himself and his inner circle. President Saleh reluctantly consented and resigned in November 2011, after 33 years in power.

Saleh’s Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi succeeded Saleh in the presidency and was elected in his own right (though he ran unopposed) in February 2012. By January 2015, the Houthis had usurped President Hadi, and he took refuge in Saudi Arabia, whence he instigated a coalition of Arab nations to bombard and retake Yemen.

As had occurred during the Sa’adah Insurgency, the Houthis were fighting Saudi Arabia, though now bolstered by its allies of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Sudan and Kuwait. Never letting a good conflict go to waste, the USA also participates in this coalition to a greater and lesser degree. Iran in turn backs the Houthis and has furnished them modern armaments.

This battle through proxies for control of Yemen has annihilated the country. Shipping to and from Yemeni ports has declined by 70%, leaving over 18 million people on the brink of starvation. In these conditions, between 2017 and 2020, Yemen suffered a crippling outbreak of cholera, the worst in its history.

Bahrain

The Arab Spring did not take in Bahrain. This small oil-rich emirate of glitz and souks is based on an archipelago of fifty natural islets and thirty-three artificial ones in the southwestern Persian Gulf. It features a Sunni monarchy in power since 1783 reigning over a predominantly Shi’ite populace. The current emir, Hamad bin Isa Salman Al Khalifa, ascended to the throne in 2002, so it was against him that protests erupted on February 14th, 2011, the so-called “Day of Rage,” in the capital of Manama. Around 6,000 protesters convened on the Pearl Roundabout to demand an elective government. Three days later, Bahraini police cracked down on the protesters, killing seven and imprisoning many more. (¶ 7) On February 22nd, 150,000 protesters returned to the Pearl Roundabout to renew their calls for reform, only for the police to fire live on the crowd, killing 20 and injuring over 100.

On March 13th, the emir declared martial law and requested troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to suppress continued protests. In July, dialogue was attempted between the government and protesters, but the Shi’ite opposition al-Wefaq withdrew since it recognized the negotiations as unproductive. At the next parliamentary by-elections, fewer than one in five voters cast ballots and eighteen al-Wefaq MPs walked out of parliament.

At the one-year anniversary of the first Arab Spring protest, activists returned to the Pearl Roundabout, which had since been significatively bulldozed and re-named al-Forouq Junction, only for Bahraini police to disperse them with teargas and rubber bullets. Nationwide crackdowns followed, complete with midnight raids, checkpoints, trials en masse and the exile of Shi’ite dissidents. To date, the emirate has reformed nothing, but in 2020 it entered the USA-sponsored Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel.

Algeria

In 2010, Algeria recorded 11,500 riots, demonstrations and public gatherings in protest of economic conditions. Such conditions were exacerbated by fiscal measures aimed at regulating black markets and produced a surge (~30%) in consumer prices for quotidian items such as sugar. In response to the Jasmine Revolution unfolding in neighboring Tunisia, between January 4th – 10th, 2011, Arab Spring protests erupted in several Algerian cities. The demonstration in Algiers mobilized 140,000 riot police, and hundreds of demonstrators were arrested.

Not to say that the Arab Spring protests in Algeria elicited no improvements. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (in office since 1999) oversaw the infusion of 20€ billion into socioeconomic programs and the constitutional amendment which recognized Amazigh as a co-official language in 2016 (Algerians by majority are genetically Amazigh or Berbers but culturally Arab). This largess bought him some extra time as he was re-elected to a fourth term in 2014’s election which six opposition parties boycotted (ultimate voter turnout at 51.3%). Yet when he announced his candidacy for a fifth term in February 2019, the Hirak Movement exploded and necessitated his resignation.

Nor did the movement stop with his resignation, but it pressed demands for institutional reforms, including the discontinuation of military control over the civil government. The Hirak Movement has not yet achieved all its objectives, but it has induced a degree of liberalization in the government, such as President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s commutation of political prisoners’ sentences.

Conspiracy or Coincidence?

Careful readers will notice the improbable convergence of circumstances in the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring toppled Muammar Gadaffi in Libya after 42 years in power, the al-Asaad dynasty in Syria (next installment) after 41 years in power, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen after 33 years in power, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt after 30 years in power, and Zine El Abidine ben Ali in Tunisia after 23 years in power. This means that the most longevous survivors of regimes in the world’s most politically volatile region of the MENA were all toppled nearly simultaneously. If this was not conspiracy engineered by certain external influences, then it was a lot of very uncanny coincidences.

Though there is evidence which suggests that these regime changes in 2011 were orchestrated (p. 29-30) by influential outsiders — such as those related (p. 16) to the synchronous Occupy Wall Street movement — it is beyond this article’s ken to explore the covert possibilities. More to the point, it does not matter much either way. If certain influences agitated for regime change in MENA countries and induced people to take lethal risks by confronting authoritarian governments, then the conditions which made regime change attractive must have existed in the first place.

Where external influences definitely exerted a noxious effect was in Syria during its transformation through the Arab Spring, but that tale merits an article all its own.